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Governments around the world require that electronic
service providers, including telecoms, ISP’s, and even
online services like Twitter and Facebook, must provide
law enforcement agencies (LEA’s) with broad access to
so-called “business records” including communications
metadata. Metadata is data about data; it does not in-
clude the contents of the users’ communications, but it
does typically show who each user communicated with,
and at what times, and for how long. Metadata is ac-
tually surprisingly powerful, especially in a time when
more and more messages are being encrypted from “end-
to-end.”
In this paper, we present a new approach for protect-
ing communications metadata and other business records
against unwarranted, bulk seizure. Our approach is de-
signed from the start to be robust against this new class of
political and legal attack. To achieve this, we borrow the
recent notion of cryptographic crumple zones [31], i.e.
encryption that can be broken, but only at a substantial
monetary cost. We propose that a service provider who
wishes to protect their users’ privacy should encrypt each
business record with its own unique, crumpled, symmet-
ric key. Then, a law enforcement agency who compels
disclosure of the records learns only ciphertext until they
expend the necessary resources to recover keys for the
records of interest. We show how this approach can be
easily applied to protect metadata in the form of network
flow records. We describe how a service provider might
select the work factor of the crumpling algorithm to al-
low legitimate investigations while preventing the use of
metadata for mass surveillance.
1 Introduction
Governments around the world require that electronic
service providers, including telecoms, ISP’s, and even
online services like Twitter and Facebook, must provide
law enforcement agencies with broad access to so-called
“business records” including communications metadata.
Metadata is data about data; it does not include the con-
tents of the users’ communications, but it does typically
show who each user communicated with, and at what
times, and for how long. Metadata is actually surpris-
ingly powerful, especially in a time when more and more
messages are being encrypted from “end-to-end.” Gen-
eral Michael Hayden, former director of both the CIA
and the NSA, famously stated, “We kill people based on
metadata” [9].
Perhaps because metadata is perceived as less sensitive
than message contents, many jurisdictions allow law en-
forcement access to metadata with relatively little over-
sight or requirement for due process. For example, the
USA FREEDOM Act [1] mandates that telecommunica-
tions providers produce “call detail records” including
the calling and receiving numbers and the duration of
each call. Such a system makes metadata vulnerable to
abuse or misuse by corrupt or overzealous law enforce-
ment agents.
At the same time, according to Granick and Pfeffer-
korn [15], US law is currently unclear (or perhaps even
undecided) on the question of whether LEAs can com-
pel disclosure of cryptographic keys or encrypted data.
In the mean time, small providers (e.g. Lavabit [26])
are especially vulnerable, since they lack the resources
of larger corporations like Apple and Facebook to fight a
lengthy court battle.
In this paper, we present a new approach for protect-
ing communications metadata and other business records
against unwarranted, bulk seizure. Our approach is de-
signed from the start to be robust against this new class
of political and legal attack. To achieve this, we adopt
the recent notion of cryptographic crumpling [31], i.e.
encryption that can be broken, but only at a substantial
monetary cost. Unlike the original application of crum-
pling, which gives the authorities new abilities to recover
messages that they could not otherwise access, here we
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propose to use the same primitive in order to limit gov-
ernment access to records that they can currently obtain
with little or no restraint.
We propose that a service provider who wishes to pro-
tect their customers’ privacy should encrypt each busi-
ness record with a crumpled symmetric key, which can
be recovered through a moderately expensive brute force
search. Even if the LEA can demand that the provider
turn over all of their records, the LEA obtains only ci-
phertext until they then expend some non-trivial mone-
tary resources to recover each plaintext record of interest.
The strategy here is to encrypt the records with parame-
ters carefully chosen so that (1) bulk, warrantless decryp-
tion is so expensive as to be infeasible, and (2) decrypting
only the records needed for a legitimate investigation is
less expensive for the LEA than fighting a court battle
against the service provider to compel disclosure of the
master key.
One limitation of this approach is that, applied naively,
it may still require the LEA to decrypt and examine
the plaintext of many records that are not relevant to
any investigation. For example, suppose the authorities
know that their suspect made a telephone call from a
certain city on a certain day. Then, given a collection
of call detail records from that city and date, and no
other way to tell which records correspond to their sus-
pect, the LEA must decrypt every record in the data set.
This is sub-optimal for both the LEA and for the pub-
lic. It wastes government funds and exposes the metadata
of potentially thousands of innocent people to unwar-
ranted scrutiny. We can eliminate most of the problem
with the use of encrypted indexes [12, 14]. As the ser-
vice provider’s systems are collecting and encrypting the
metadata records, they should also create an encrypted
inverted index, that is, an encrypted data structure that
maps each keyword in the plaintext business records to
the list of encrypted records that contain the given key-
word. Then, to recover the plaintext records correspond-
ing to some keyword, for example an IP address or tele-
phone number, the LEA must first query the encrypted
index to obtain the list of matching encrypted records.
Next, the LEA must expend resources to decrypt the list
of records, and finally, they must expend even more re-
sources to decrypt each encrypted record in the list.
2 Metadata Uses and Privacy Concerns
Communications metadata is so readily available to au-
thorities because it is commonly collected and used by
providers for legitimate purposes. These purposes in-
clude: system management and capacity planning; iden-
tifying users who misuse or abuse the service; and de-
tecting intrusions.
2.1 Uses of Metadata
In this section we give a brief overview of some common
kinds of metadata for various communication systems.
Telephony In telephone systems, call detail records
(CDRs) store metadata about telephone calls and text
messages [17]. CDRs include the start and end time (or
the duration) for each call and the telephone numbers of
the caller and the callee. This data is useful not only
for the telecom provider’s own internal network man-
agement and planning, but also for research in other ar-
eas [5], including urban planning and development, per-
sonal mobility, and security and privacy.
IP Networks The most common format for network-
level metadata is Cisco’s Netflow [8]. Netflow records
describe “flows” of network-layer packets sharing the
same source and destination IP addresses, the same
transport-layer protocol, and the same transport-layer
source and destination ports. Intuitively, each flow corre-
sponds to one “half” or one “side” of a TCP connection.
For each flow, Netflow records give the total number of
network-layer packets in the flow, the total number of
bytes, and the arrival time of the first and last observed
packets in the flow.
The most popular versions of Netflow are version 5
and version 9 [8]. Version 5 defines a fixed record format
for every flow and supports only IP version 4 networks.
Version 9 [8] defines a much more flexible, template-
based record format and supports many other network-
layer protocols, including IP version 6 and MPLS. Net-
flow v9’s template approach was intended to make it easy
to add new features without breaking backward compat-
ibility with older devices. In Section 4, we describe how
this extensibility can be used to add crumpled encryption
to Netflow logs.
SMTP Email The simple mail transport protocol [19]
is used to transmit email messages from client to server
and from server to server. SMTP servers typically log
the source address (“MAIL FROM”), destination address
(“RCPT TO”), the arrival time, and the total size of each
email that they receive.
Exceptions Some privacy-focused providers, such as
the Signal encrypted messaging app, deliberately avoid
logging metadata to non-volatile storage, in order to
maximize users’ privacy against LEA requests [27]. In
doing so, they lose the ability to track how their system
is used over time. Many providers who lack the engi-
neering expertise and financial backing that Signal en-
joys may not be able to afford such a trade-off.
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2.2 (Meta)data Privacy
One of the first major legal attacks on privacy and con-
fidentiality of communications was the Clinton admin-
istration’s attempt in the 1990’s to mandate key escrow
[2, 10] for all encryption through use of the Clipper chip
[4, 23]. More recently, the encrypted email provider
Lavabit fought and lost against demands from the US
government for encrypted data [26]. (Lavabit’s vulner-
ability to this attack was amplified by a design flaw that
gave them the ability to decrypt users’ files [21].) The
most famous legal attack against a provider of secure
communications was the 2016 attempt by the FBI to
compel Apple to assist in decrypting an iPhone once used
by a terrorist [18]. Lewis et al describe the varying le-
gal requirements for access to encrypted data around the
world [20]. Granick and Pfefferkorn discuss the current
legal ambiguity around LEA access to encrypted data in
the US [15].
Protecting metadata is even more difficult from both a
legal and technological standpoint. Legally, many coun-
tries make it easier for governments to acquire metadata
than the contents of communications. For instance, in
the United States, the Electronic Communications Pri-
vacy Act (ECPA) explicitly requires a higher bar for
acquiring communication content (a warrant) than for
non-contents like metadata (a subpoena, and sometimes
not even this). Technologically, research into protect-
ing metadata lagged decades behind cryptographic prim-
itives like encryption for the protection of data contents.
Approaches for protecting metadata typically focus on
obscuring the communicating endpoints from observa-
tion by service providers in the first place, by chan-
neling communications pseudorandomly through a net-
work of intermediaries. Various approaches include:
Chaum’s mixes [6], Tor [11], I2P [32], Loopix [25], Vu-
vuzela [29], and Stadium [28].
3 Addressing Government Overreach
In this work, we consider a different point of view in
which the service provider is not the adversary. Instead,
this work focuses on the design of low-cost tools that a
service provider can deploy proactively to protect against
overzealous government requests for information. We
believe that this threat has ample precedent, including
the legal disputes mentioned in the previous section. We
comment that our work might also influence the discov-
ery process in civil lawsuits, although this is not a focus
of our work.
We rely upon a communication service provider’s in-
terest in protecting their customers’ civil liberties against
unreasonable search and seizure. (We acknowledge that
the validity of this assumption may vary widely be-
tween different types of service providers; e.g., federated
chat platforms versus established large telecommunica-
tion providers). Our technological objective is to give the
LEA a workable approach for obtaining (only) the data
that it needs while reducing the risk that the government
can obtain large amounts of metadata.
3.1 Technology in the Context of Society
While this work focuses on the design of a technological
measure, we stress upfront that it is intended to comple-
ment social and legal structures rather than to supplant
them. Our goal is merely to equip small communications
providers and privacy advocates with low-cost tools that
they need to fight and win in courts of law, as well as in
the court of public opinion. As a result, we assume in this
work that the courts place some value on privacy and on
limiting the powers of law enforcement; an authoritarian
regime with weak courts could always demand the mas-
ter decryption key.
Furthermore, we continue to rely upon established le-
gal and societal safeguards against against targeted mis-
use or abuse of the system by LEAs who are willing to
expend public resources for their own corrupt or illicit
goals, against which our approach provides no techno-
logical protection. Existing legal incentives against tar-
geted misuse include, for instance, the criminal penal-
ties that employees of the United States federal govern-
ment face for misusing government property (e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 741) or for using government property for per-
sonal benefit (e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 2635.704). Our work relies
upon a technological tool called crumpling that requires
the expenditure of government resources, thereby creat-
ing the opportunity to leverage existing legal incentives
against misuse.
3.2 Technological Tool: Crumpling
The main tool we use to protect metadata is crypto-
graphic crumpling, a notion recently proposed by Wright
and Varia [31] as a more secure alternative to key escrow
or other encryption “back doors.” They propose two
classes of cryptographic puzzles for constructing encryp-
tion schemes that are breakable only through immense
expenditure of resources. First, an abrasion puzzle is
one that costs many millions, perhaps billions, of dollars
to solve, and thus serves as a gatekeeper to discourage
any adversary except for a nation state from investing in
a key recovery effort. Second, a crumpling puzzle is one
that can be applied to derive each symmetric key, and that
can be solved for a moderate amount of money, e.g. hun-
dreds or thousands of dollars. Because crumpling puz-
zles only use existing symmetric cryptography standards,
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crumpled encryption is incredibly fast and also benefits
from existing hardware crypto acceleration (cf. §4.4).
We stress this work and [31] use the same fundamental
crypto tool for very different ends. Wright and Varia [31]
weakens the security of existing encryption systems in
the hope of avoiding an even greater loss to political and
legal attacks. By contrast, this work applies the crum-
pling to metadata, which is currently exposed in the clear
in most cases, rather than to the contents of end-to-end
encrypted messages. As a result, this work gives a mono-
tone increase in privacy.
3.3 Two Motivating Scenarios
Here we describe one hypothetical example and one his-
torical example to illustrate how our techniques could
be used to protect users’ privacy against unreasonable or
overly broad demands for bulk metadata.
We envision our approach as being especially appeal-
ing for smaller communications providers who value
their customers’ privacy but also appreciate the rule of
law and the need for law enforcement access in legiti-
mate investigations. Eventually, we hope that it might be
adopted by larger providers who share similar values.
Scenario 1: Counter-Terrorism Investigation Sup-
pose a national law enforcement agency receives a tip
that a terrorist cell might be starting to plot an attack in
a certain city. The LEA can use its emergency powers to
obtain the telephone records of everyone who lives in the
target city.
If the records are turned over in plaintext, then the
LEA can immediately perform some network analysis to
help identify the conspirators based on their communica-
tions patterns. However, obtaining such a large number
of call records also gives the LEA everything they need
to perform a similar analysis targeting peaceful protest
groups, civil rights activists, political organizers, and
similar groups.
If the telephone records are protected using our ap-
proach, then the LEA must be more careful in their anal-
ysis. If the LEA knows one of the conspirators’ tele-
phone numbers, or the number of someone with whom
they have recently corresponded, then they can still ob-
tain the information that they need. First, they use the
encrypted index (Section 4.1) to find the list of encrypted
metadata records related to the first known suspect in the
terror network. Then they decrypt the matching records
to learn which other telephone numbers have communi-
cated with the first suspect. The process continues until
the LEA has identified enough suspects to proceed with
the next phase of their investigation, for example with
digital or physical surveillance, search warrants, arrests,
etc.
In order to also map out the networks of protestors
or activists, the LEA must expend substantial additional
resources beyond what was required for the legitimate
investigation. If we assume that terror cells are much
less common than protestors and activists, this creates
the possibility that the communications providers could
carefully tune the decryption costs so that the LEA’s bud-
get allows it to perform all legitimate investigations and
not too much else. The question of how exactly to set the
costs to achieve such a delicate balance remains an open
question and is outside the scope of this paper.
Scenario 2: Unusually Broad Warrants In 2017, a
judge in North Carolina granted local police a very broad
search warrant for information on all Google accounts
for users within several acres of the site of a murder [13].
It is unclear how many people were affected, but depend-
ing on the population density in the given area, the num-
ber could be in the hundreds or thousands. Although
such broad warrants are believed to be quite rare in prac-
tice, the North Carolina case shows that these things do
happen in the real world.
If Google had used our techniques to protect the meta-
data records (if any) that they turned over in response
to the warrant, then the incidental exposure of innocent
people could have been reduced. Suppose there were 300
people with Google accounts in the 17 acres covered by
the warrant. Then our approach makes it 100 times more
expensive to examine all records versus examining only
those records for the top 3 suspects. Although the local
police could likely afford a very broad search in one or
two cases, a department that routinely multiplies its data
recovery costs by a factor of 100 would quickly expend
its budget.
4 Proposed Constructions
In this section, we present a novel application of “crum-
pled” encryption to protect communications metadata
and other business records against bulk search and
seizure. We use network flow records as our running ex-
ample of a metadata source that a small service provider
might want to protect. We chose this data type because it
is simple and well known to many readers with interests
in free and open communication. Of course, the same
techniques could also be used to protect packet header
traces or communications logs produced by email servers
or by other messaging services, e.g. internet relay chat
(IRC) or the Matrix [30] federated chat platform.
Let KM be the master secret key for a set of records.
To protect against seizure of the master key, it might be
held within a secure enclave or derived from a passphrase
known only to a few trusted personnel. We do not use KM
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to encrypt any records—only to generate other keys.
In recent versions of Netflow, flow records are trans-
mitted and stored in groups called FlowSets [8]. Each
Netflow export packet consists of some header informa-
tion including a timestamp, the source ID of the device
that collected the flow records, and a sequence number
unique to the Netflow export packet. The packet then
contains template flowsets describing the format of the
following flow records and data flowsets that contain the
flow records describing each observed network flow.
For the ith netflow record r of the jth data flowset
in a Netflow packet having sequence number Seq and
source ID sID, we generate a unique, crumpled encryp-
tion key as follows. First, we generate a random salt s
and a random nonce n. Unlike earlier applications of
cryptographic crumpling, we do not have an “original”
full-strength encryption key to crumple. So we simply
generate one, using a pseudorandom function F with the
master key and the salt s:
k0← FKM (s)
Then we derive the crumpled key k1 from our made-
up “original” key k0 and the Netflow packet’s metadata
about the flow record r. The crumpling algorithm applies
two hash functions to the key and its associated data.
The “little” hash function h projects the “original” key k0
down into a much smaller space of size 2`, which can be
brute-force searched via a moderately expensive compu-
tation on advanced hardware. (See Section 5.) The outer
hash function H maps the reduced-strength key back into
the proper number of bits for use as an encryption key,
e.g. 128 or 256 bits. Although the resulting key is the
same length as a normal key, we call ` its effective length,
because it provides only ` bits of security.
k1← H(h(k0) || sID || Seq || i || j || n || padding)
The padding is required so that the outer hash H will
be computed over a block of data the of same size as the
header that is hashed in the Bitcoin mining function [22].
This allows us to accurately predict the cost to recover
the key through a brute-force search. (See Section 5.)
For a more detailed security analysis of this construction,
we refer the reader to the original work on crumpling
[31]. Finally, we encrypt the original contents of the flow
record, using k1 as the encryption key.
r′← Enc(k1,r)
Finally, we save the encrypted flow record r′, along
with its plaintext nonce and salt. The most recent ver-
sions of the Netflow specification [8] support flexible
template-based record formats. We propose to make use
of this functionality to support breakable encryption of
arbitrary records. To do so, we simply add to the existing
record template new fields for our nonce and salt, and
for any other cryptographic data required for the encryp-
tion itself, e.g. an initialization vector (IV) or a message
authentication code (MAC).
Given these encrypted records, the data owner can
use the master key KM together with the salt to effi-
ciently re-derive the key to decrypt any record. An LEA
who obtains the encrypted record does not immediately
learn anything about the encrypted flows except for their
timestamps. But by brute-force searching all the pos-
sibilities for the secret h(k0), the LEA can recover any
desired decryption key k1 by expending the necessary re-
sources.
4.1 Reducing Incidental Exposure
To reduce the number of irrelevant records exposed to
law enforcement, and to reduce the unnecessary expendi-
ture of resources to recover those records, we propose to
use techniques developed for symmetric searchable en-
cryption [12]. The idea is that, as the system receives,
encrypts, and stores the individual records, it should also
create (in memory) a search index over the records that
it has seen. Then, at some regular interval, e.g. every
hour or every day, the system should encrypt the index
and save it to non-volatile storage.
The index is a data structure that maps from keywords
or header values, e.g. phone numbers or IP addresses, to
the lists of encrypted records that contain those values.
In practice, the index can be implemented in a very sim-
ple structure, especially if it is saved to disk frequently
enough that the number of records for the most common
keyword is not too much longer than the list for less-
frequent keywords. In its simplest form, the index can be
saved in a key-value store such as Berkeley DB [24] or
any number of NoSQL databases.
The index for each keyword w during indexing interval
i is encoded as a key-value pair (K,V ), where
K = H(w||i)
V = Enc(kw,i,< r1,r2, . . . ,rn >)
and < r1,r2, . . . ,rn > is the list of encrypted records cre-
ated in interval i that contain keyword w. To further limit
the reach of the LEA, the key kw,i should also be a crum-
pled key. For example, let
kw,i← H(h(FKM (w||i)) || w || i || padding)
Then the LEA must also break that encryption in order
to recover the list of matching encrypted records for w.
4.2 Indexing Structured Data
The term “keyword” implies free-form, unstructured data
such as natural language text. In fact much of the search-
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able encryption literature was written with unstructured
data in mind.
However, business records tend to consist of structured
data, where each record follows the same schema, and
each attribute in the record has a known, fixed data type.
For structured data, it makes sense to enable searches on
particular attribures. For example, in a packet capture
data set, the LEA might want to find all records where
SrcIP = 6.6.6.6. We can support queries over structured
data using the construction sketched above with the fol-
lowing simple extension.
For attribute a taking on value v, we store the list of
encrypted records from interval i having a = v as the pair
(K,V ) in the key-value store, where
K = H(a||v||i)
V = Enc(ka,v,i,< r1,r2, . . . ,rn >)
and, as above, the key ka,v,i is also a crumpled key.
4.3 Conjunctive and Disjunctive Queries
The encrypted index construction described above is ad-
mittedly quite crude compared to recent work in search-
able encryption [12], but it suffices for our needs. It can
also support (again in a crude way) more sophisticated
kinds of queries. For example, to find all records con-
taining both keywords w1 and w2, the LEA can query for
each keyword individually, obtain the lists of matching
records, and take the set intersection of the lists. Simi-
larly, to find the records containing w1 or w2, they can
take the set union of the two lists.
4.4 Overhead Incurred by the Provider
Our approach requires that the provider must expend ad-
ditional resources to protect their users’ privacy. In prac-
tice, they are unlikely to do so if the cost is too high. For-
tunately, our constructions require relatively few cryp-
tographic operations, all of which are symmetric rather
than public key and can be efficiently accelerated in hard-
ware.
Runtime Performance To encrypt a metadata record,
we must first derive the key, then perform the actual en-
cryption. To derive a crumpled encryption key, we re-
quire just four invocations of the SHA256 hash function.
Because metadata records tend to be small — on the or-
der of several dozen bytes — the encryption itself should
be similarly inexpensive on modern commodity hard-
ware. Since 2010, Intel processors have supported spe-
cialized instructions for AES encryption and decryption,
offering very fast performance of between 1–4 clock cy-
cles per byte [3]. Since 2013, they also support instruc-
tions for accelerating the SHA256 hash used to derive the
key [16].
Storage Overhead The provider must also expend ex-
tra resources to store the additional data necessary for
key derivation and decryption of each encrypted record.
These data include the initialization vector (IV) and mes-
sage authentication code (if any) required by the encryp-
tion scheme and the nonce and the salt that we use to
derive the crumpled key.
For example, suppose a collection of Netflow records
uses a template that includes all the same information as
the old v5 Netflow. (See Table B-4 in [7].) Then each
plaintext flow record is 48 bytes long. With AES in CBC
mode, the initialization vector is 16 bytes. If our nonce
and salt are each also 16 bytes, then the crumpled en-
crypted Netflow record consumes twice as much space
as the original plaintext record.
Legal Risks A provider that uses our techniques also
risks the possibility of a court battle with a law en-
forcement agency who is unhappy with limited access
to crumpled metadata records and demands the master
key. We believe this risk can be mitigated by choosing
reasonable decryption costs; we give an example in the
following section. However, the risk can never be elimi-
nated entirely.
5 Estimating Real-World Costs for the
LEA
In the previous work on crumpled encryption [31], we
used the energy efficiency of commercial Bitcoin mining
devices and the price of electricity in the United States
to predict the real-world expected cost (in dollars) of re-
covering a crumpled key. We estimated that, using the
most efficient commercially available mining hardware,
an LEA would spend on average about one dollar to
recover a crumpled key with an effective length of 50
bits. Then, for each 10 additional bits of effective key
length, the LEA’s expected cost increases by a factor of
210 ≈ 1000. The projected costs are summarized in Ta-
ble 1.
Effective Key Expected
Length (bits) Cost ($)
50 1
60 210 ≈ $1K
70 220 ≈ $1M
80 230 ≈ $1B
90 240 ≈ $1T
Table 1: Projected costs to recover crumpled keys [31]
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Example: Call Records Suppose we impose a small
but unavoidable new cost of $8 per “call detail record”
from a telephone provider. Based on the estimates in Ta-
ble 1, we can do this by encrypting each record with a key
having an effective length of just 53 bits. Then, targeted
monitoring of a criminal suspect who makes 100 calls
per month would cost less than $10K per year—a small
price relative to the salaries of the technicians, police of-
ficers, detectives, and prosecuting attorneys working the
case. Assuming the same average rate of 100 calls per
user per month, monitoring all 300 million Americans
would cost more than $2.88 trillion per year—more than
half the budget of the US federal government in 2016.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we described a new technique for protect-
ing communications metadata against bulk surveillance.
Our approach, based on the recent notion of breakable
“crumpled” encryption, is designed to be robust not only
against technical (e.g. cryptanalytic) attacks, but also
against a new class of political and legal attacks that cir-
cumvent technical protections to obtain secrets via court
order or legislative mandate. Our approach is not guaran-
teed to succeed in all cases. Nevertheless, we hope that it
may enable privacy-oriented communications providers
and privacy advocates to fight and win in courts of law, as
well as in the court of public opinion. Finally, we stress
that our technological approach is designed to leverage
rather than sidestep existing legal and societal systems;
nevertheless, improving accountability further remains
an important topic for future work.
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